關於 legitimacy definition ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

#Opinion by Benedict Rogers 羅傑斯 | "Let the true patriots around the world arise – those who are loyal to their people, values and consciences, who genuinely love their country and their neighbor, and who yearn for legitimate government. They are the people who can swear a meaningful oath, to represent, defend and govern – with consent – their people. The tyrants can’t – and we must constantly remind them of that fact."

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【#TheDiplomat: 沈旭暉隨緣家書英文版🇭🇰】很久沒有向國際關係評論網 The Diplomat 供稿，但國際線十分重要，不應放棄。這次他們希望分享23條、國安法、反恐法風雨欲來的「新香港」前瞻，願國際社會能多了解快將出現的危機：

While the world is preoccupied with a fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing has been tightening its political grip on all aspects of Hong Kong’s civil society. Rumor has it that Beijing will push through legislating national security laws under Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law by unconventional means, such as massively disqualifying pro-democratic legislators or even directly applying a national law, widely argued as a major step to destroy the rights and freedom of Hong Kongers, and bring Chinese authoritarianism to Hong Kong.

After the 2019 protests, the administration of Carrie Lam, who theoretically is still leading the special administrative region of China, has little political capital at stake, with its legitimacy reaching rock bottom. The pro-government camp has dwindling prospects for the city’s upcoming Legislative Council election. The government‘s ”nothing to lose“ mentality is apparent from its recent blatant reinterpretation of the Basic Law’s Article 22 (another article that limits the influence of China’s offices in Hong Kong’s internal affairs). The debate is nothing new, but the pressure this time is quite different.

This article highlights the different strategies Beijing could adopt to enact Article 23 insidiously or under disguise to avoid backlash from the international community, while continuing to reap benefits from the city’s globally recognized special status. This seems to be part of Beijing’s brinkmanship to bring Hong Kong protesters and their supporters to their knees and move the city closer to authoritarianism. To counter these moves, Hong Kongers must define the boundaries beyond which Hong Kong falls into authoritarian rule and make a case as to why the city’s downfall is detrimental to the international community‘s interest.

The Long-Term Controversy Over National Security Laws

Back in 2003, the implementation of Article 23 was thwarted by the moderate pro-establishment politician James Tien. In face of overwhelming public disapproval of the law, he withdrew support and votes from his Liberal Party. However, 17 years later, it is hard to imagine Beijing following the old legislative playbook: start with a public consultation, followed by public discourse and political debate, and end with the majority rule. This playbook only works in peaceful societies ruled by a trustworthy government with integrity.

The aftermath of 2003, as well as the 2019 protests, should have taught Beijing and the Hong Kong government a lesson: pushing through national security legislation in a flawed parliament controlled by the minority pro-government camp would inevitably set off another full city-scale protest — and undoubtedly more fierce and focused this time. Given the current government’s numerous displays of dishonesty, it is conceivable that they will embark on a less-traveled path to implement Article 23.

Strategy One: “Anti-Terrorism”

In principle, one possible strategy could be to directly enact Chinese national law across Hong Kong, which can be achieved by declaring a state of emergency in the city. However, this is risky business as it would tarnish the integrity of “one country two systems” and subsequently Hong Kong’s international standing. Beijing, a risk-averse regime, is also unwilling to see Hong Kong’s status as a middleman for laundering money disappear into thin air.

Instead, Beijing could be concocting a narrative that would see Chinese national law applied to Hong Kong while not damaging Hong Kong’s international standing and Beijing’s own interests. The key word in this script is “anti-terrorism.” As early as 2014, pro-Beijing scholars have been claiming the emergence of “local terrorist ideology” on Hong Kong soil. Since the anti-extradition bill protests last year, government rhetoric frequently described the protests, which caused no deaths at all in the entire year, with phrases like “inclination to terrorist ideology.” That was a signal to the world that Hong Kong’s internal conflicts had ballooned into a national security issue. This gives the government the legitimacy to justify the implementation of Chinese national laws across the highly autonomous region to counter terrorism. The Chinese government knows that if it can persuade the world that terrorism exists in Hong Kong, and that it is as severe as the terror threat facing many other nations today, the international community will be less critical of Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong. Enacting Chinese laws directly is a convenient path that will save Beijing from having to tackle Hong Kong’s internal conflicts, basically turning the Hong Kong issue into a nonissue.

Strategy Two: Stacking the Legislature by Disqualifying Candidates

An even bolder strategy was probably foretold by a recent incident where the Hong Kong government and Beijing’s agencies for Hong Kong affairs (HKMAO and the Liaison Office) jointly criticized lawmaker Dennis Kwok for filibustering, framing it as “misconduct in public office” and “violating his oath.” It is incomprehensible to claim that filibustering goes against a lawmaker’s main duty; rather, it is common understanding that legislative work includes debating the law and representing public opinion against unreasonable laws. In a parliament controlled by the minority, pro-democratic members representing the majority of Hong Kongers are forced to express their objections using means like filibustering. Wouldn’t a lack of different political opinions turn the legislative branch into a rubber-stamp institution?

The above allegation has set a dangerous precedent for twisting the logic behind a certain provision in the Basic Law to target opposing lawmakers. In other words, to fulfill Beijing’s interpretation of the principal requirement for holding public office in Hong Kong, one could be required to take a meticulously legalistic approach to uphold the Basic Law down to its every single wording. A public official, by this new definition, not only needs to support “one country, two systems” or object Hong Kong independence, but also must abide by every single provision in the Basic Law. Worst of all, based on the previous cases, whether an official’s words or actions oversteps a provision is up to Beijing’s interpretation of his/her “intent.”

If this approach is applied, in the next election, there might be additional official questions for screening candidates like the following: “The Basic Law states that the enactment of Article 23 is a constitutional duty. Failing to support Article 23 legislation violates the Basic Law. Do you support it?” This question would suffice to disqualify even moderate or even pro-establishment candidates like James Tien. Even if any pro-democratic candidates were elected, once Article 23 re-enters the legislative process, they could risk ouster by raising objections.

Despite the absurdity of this tactic, the Chinese regime may just be tempted enough if such a strategy could resolve two of China’s current nuisances — voices of dissent in the Legislative Council and the previous failure to implement Article 23.

Strategy Three: The “Boiling Frog Effect”

Article 23 is not yet implemented, but the dystopian world that the protesters pictured in 2003 is already becoming reality. Regular citizens have been persecuted for “sedition” for sharing their views on social media or participating in legal protests; workers face retaliation for taking part in strikes; corporations are pressured to publicly side with the government’s stance; employees who have the “wrong” political views are fired; schools have been closely monitored for teaching material; protest-supporting fundraisers were framed for money laundering; a retweet or like may lead to persecution, under a colonial-era law. Only now have Hong Kongers woken up to their new reality — although the Basic Law technically protects citizens’ rights to speak, rally, march, demonstrate, and go on strike, the government could enfeeble civil rights by bending antiquated laws and legal provisions. The frequent abuse of law enforcement power on a small scale, such as improper arrests and police violence, is desensitizing the public and the international community. In a few years, Hong Kong will become unrecognizable. This is indeed a clever play on Beijing’s part to slowly strip away Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom, without causing much international attention.

Counter-Strategies Against Beijing’s Brinkmanship

Beijing’s overarching goal is to hollow out Hong Kong but, at the same time, avoid major backlash from the international community, which could spell the end of the privileged global status of Hong Kong not granted to other Chinese cities. Beijing also aims at preventing single incidents that could cascade down into mass protests as seen in 2003, 2014, and 2019; and eliminating any resistance forces from within Hong Kong’s legislature. The tactics outlined above are typical in a game of brinkmanship.

In response, Hong Kongers in Hong Kong and on the so-called “international frontline” must know their strengths and bargaining chips on this negotiating table with Beijing.

Unlike Xinjiang and Tibet, Hong Kong is a city with transparency and free flow of information. Hong Kongers need to make a case to the world that the protests are not acts of terrorism. Some suggestions include comparing the Hong Kong protests to similar struggles in 20 or so other counties in the world at the present time, none of which were classified as terrorism; collecting a large amount of concrete evidence of the disproportionate use of force by the Hong Kong police; and showing how enacting Chinese national laws in Hong Kong will end the city’s autonomy and spell disaster for international community‘s interests.

The Legislative Council is the institution that can counteract Beijing’s “boiling frog” strategy and to keep Hong Kongers’ hope alive in the system. Those who plan to run for legislative office must be prepared to be disqualified from running. If only individuals are banned, there need to be alternative candidates as back-up plans. However, if and when the disqualification process is applied broadly to entire camps of candidates (for example, all who object to Article 23), the pro-democracy camp must make a strong case to the Hong Kong and global public that this is the endgame for Hong Kong democracy. Then the incumbent popularly elected legislators will hold the internationally recognized mandate from the public and serve as the last resistance.

These recommendations delineates how the slogan “if we burn, you burn with us,” often seen in the protests, may play out in the game of international relations. If the national security laws are “passed” by a legislature that is jury-rigged in this manner, or if related national laws are directly implemented in Hong Kong, Hong Kongers should signal clearly to the world that it goes way beyond the promised “one country, two systems.” Crossing this red line by Beijing should be seen by the world as a blunt violation of its promised autonomy to Hong Kongers. At that time, if the international community led by the United States and the United Kingdom decided to revoke the “non-sovereignty entity” status of Hong Kong and regard the SAR as an ordinary Chinese city, it shouldn’t come as a surprise.

Dr. Simon Shen is the Founding Chairman of GLOs (Glocal Learning Offices), an international relations start-up company. He also serves as an adjunct associate professor in the University of Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and associate director of the Master of Global Political Economy Programme of the CUHK. The author acknowledges Jean Lin, Coco Ho, Chris Wong, Michelle King, and Alex Yap for their assistance in this piece.

▶️ 高度自治 vs 全面管治
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwt8wZl8jHQ

【專題訪問 Interview Feature】2019年度香港大學學生會周年大選中央幹事會候選内閣蒼傲訪問（外務篇） | Interview with Prism, the Proposed Cabinet of Executive Committee, The Hong Kong University Students’ Union of Annual Election 2019 (External Affairs)

(Please scroll down for English version.)

中央幹事會候選內閣蒼傲就外務議題接受本台訪問，就不同外務議題立場，包括不反對政府取締民族黨的原因、相信政府DQ議員合法的理據、初一事件有黑幫介入的看法、及對法律制度有信心的理由等發表意見。

訪問節錄如下：

1. 你們的政治光譜/政治立場是甚麼？
我們認為用現有的名詞並不能表達我們莊的政治立場，因為例如本土、港獨等，第一他們並沒有清晰的界定，或是社會一致的定義，我們都認為不論是政治光譜或是政治立場我們作為香港人或是香港接受教育的人，其實我們的立場都會傾向由香港出發。但由香港出發去考慮香港利益時，我們都要考慮時間軸。時間軸的意思是，我們到底在考慮短期還是長期的利益。加上香港的地理位置、經濟結構其實都十分依賴世界上大部份的國家，不論金融、出口產業，所以在考慮香港利益同時，我們都應考慮鄰近國家的政策、議案的推出。所以如果要用幾個字去形容我們的政治立場，我們會選擇「國際視野，本土出發」八個字。前者是考想利益的角度,後者是執行的角度。

2. 你們是否支持香港獨立？
首先我們認為它可以被自由地討論，特別是在大學之內。至於是否贊成香港獨立方面，港獨並非香港現時可執行最好的決策，因為尚有很多的選擇可加以考慮及討論。另外我認為香港內部的問題都非常嚴峻，例如我們在政綱小册子上提到的外務議題，如學生自殺、高樓價、創新科技嚴重落後等問題。這些都是我們內部必須解決和面對的問題，所以我們會將那些內部問題列為最優先需要處理的問題。

3. 你們覺得香港獨立是否合法？
我們認為任何符合法例的討論都是可被接受的，所以我們認為只要某個人或團體在現時完善的法律制度下，加上沒有違反法律，就應可就不同議題提出想法。

4. 你們是否同意香港政府取締香港民族黨？
首先我們相信香港的法治仍然相當完善，所以就香港一套完整司法制度體系下做出的判決，我們並沒有太多質疑或反對。對於民族黨被政府取締或禁止，社會上有不同聲音，但我們相信我們應遵守絕大部分香港市民都認同是完善的法律體系下作出的任何決策。

5. 你們是否同意香港政府DQ議員？
其實我們由始至終都相信，而坊間一些調查機構都指出香港的法治制度在世界上都名列前茅，所以我們相信這套法治制度可以帶來公平的審訊，所以對於有部分議員被DQ，我們願意相信整個判決過程是公平的，並且有足夠理據去支持政府所作的判決，所以我們對這件事沒有任何特別意見。

6. 你們是否支持人大釋法？
每一個法律的訂立，其實都是由一小部分的精英去開始建構框架，然後隨社會的進步不斷完善。所以法律並非一本已經印刷好的書，而是容許我們不斷修改、去完善，就一些前人的不足作補完。人大釋法亦都如是，我相信重點是我們希望這法列在微調後能得到愈來愈多香港人的支持，這才是一個成功的新詮釋。

7. 你們是否同意一國兩制？
我們支持所有在香港回歸時所簽訂的條文，其中當然包括一國兩制。

8. 你們是否支持國歌法和23條立法？
因為爭議聲非常之多，所以我們不希望對任何未實施或未明文規定的法例作出過多評論。這是對該法案有所偏頗，該法案到最後還有很多相議的空間，所以我們認為政府應充分考慮各種聲音，從而推出一條為大部分港人所接受的法例。

9. 你們對違法達義有何看法？
香港作為擁有完善法律的城市，任何人都有表達訴求或是行動的權利。我們主張每人都有自由去決定自己的事、想表達的聲音，但每人都應為這些行為勇敢承擔相認的法律責任。當然我們更相信這套法律體系是完善和公平的。

10. 你們對初一事件有何看法？
對旺角騷動，很多報紙傳媒都報道了有不法份子甚至黑社會的介入，所以旺角騷動的那一批示威者是否單純為表達而表達的市民呢？

11. 你們是否同意政府以暴動罪控告參與者？
就對這幾名人士進行拘捕的行為，我們希望香港政府有真憑實據去支持，以及整個審訊過程認該要公平。我希望他們得到公平的審訊。

Campus TV has interviewed with Prism, the Proposed Cabinet of Executive Committee, The Hong Kong University Students’ Union, Session 2019, with regards to their treatment of external affairs. Prism has expressed their stance and opinions on various external issues, which include: their not opposing the Hong Kong government’s banning of the Hong Kong National Party, believing in the government’s legitimacy for the disqualification of legislators, believing in the involvement of gangs in the Mong Kok Incident of 2016, and expressing their confidence in the current legal system.

The interview excerpts are as follows:

1. Where do you stand on the political spectrum? / How would you define your political stance?
We believe the current word items are unable to express our Cabinet’s political stance. For example, if you consider the term localism or Hong Kong independence, these groups have not a clear boundary or universal definition given by the society. Whether it be the political spectrum or political stance, us who are Hong Kong-ers or who have been educated in Hong Kong, have a tendency to think from the standpoint of Hong Kong. If we consider the benefits from the standpoint of Hong Kong, we also need to consider the timeline. This (the timeline) means, that we should consider if these benefits are of short term or long term. Therefore, when considering Hong Kong’s benefits, we should also consider the policies and bills of neighbouring countries. Therefore, if we had to define our political stance in terms, it would be “international perspective that comes from a local standpoint”. The former is a consideration to the benefits, the latter is a consideration to the execution.

2. Do you support Hong Kong independence?
Firstly, we think this matter could be discussed freely, especially within the premises of the University. In terms of agreeing with Hong Kong independence, we think that Hong Kong independence is currently not the best option to be executed in Hong Kong, because there are still many other options to consider and discuss about. In addition, I think that Hong Kong’s internal affairs are very severe, like the external affairs that are mentioned in our campaign booklet, for example, students’ suicides, rising property prices, the severely outdated innovation and technology. These are problems that our internal department has to confront and resolve, therefore we put these internal affairs as our priority.

3. Do you think that Hong Kong independence is legal?
We believe any discussion that is in compliance with the law is acceptable. Therefore, we think that under the current, comprehensive legal system, with no breaching of the law, a person or group should be allowed to speak their thoughts on different issues.

4. Do you agree with Hong Kong government’s banning of the Hong Kong National Party?
Firstly, we believe that Hong Kong’s rule of law is still quite comprehensive. Therefore, we do not have much hesitation nor opposition for a judgment that is based on what we consider to be an intact judicial system of Hong Kong. In terms of the banning of the Hong Kong National Party, the society has different voices, but we believe we ought to obey the judgment that comes from what the majority of Hong Kong considers to be a comprehensive legal system.

5. Do you agree with Hong Kong government’s disqualification of legislators?
Actually, we have since the very beginning believed in Hong Kong’s rule of law as quite a frontrunner in the world; this has been backed by some survey organisations within the community too, so we believe that this rule of law can bring out a fair trial. Therefore, in regards to the disqualification of some legislators, we willingly believe that the entirety of the judgment process has been fair, with sufficient arguments to back up the government’s verdict. We do not express any special opinions towards this incident.

6. Do you support the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress’ Interpretation of the Basic Law (SCNPC's Interpretation of BL, or Interpretation of the Basic Law by the SCNPC)?
For the enactment of every legislation, it starts from a small portion of elites that begin to build its (the legislation’s) framework, it then continues to be improved as society grows. For this reason, the law is not a printed book, it allows us to continually amend, better, and complete items that are left neglected or faulted by predecessors. This applies for the SCNPC's Interpretation of BL, I believe the most important thing is, we hope to gain more Hong Kong-ers’ support under these fine-tunings (by the SCNPC's Interpretation of BL), we think this is what counts as a successful re-interpretation of the law.

7. Do you agree with the constitutional principle of “one country, two systems”?
We support all the terms that were signed in the Handover of Hong Kong, and this definitely includes the principle of “one country, two systems”.

8. Do you support the National Anthem Bill and the enactment of Article 23?
Due to the many controversies on this matter, we do not wish to comment on any legislation that has yet to be implemented or stipulated in explicit terms. This would be a prejudice on the said bill(s). These bills still have a lot of room for negotiation, so we believe the government should consider different voices, so as to introduce a legislation that is accepted by the majority of Hong Kong-ers.

9. What are your views on the idea of achieving justice by violating the law?
Hong Kong is a city with a comprehensive legal system; anyone has the right to express their own appeal or action. We advocate that everyone has the freedom to decide for their own deeds and express their own thoughts, but everyone should also be responsible to bear the consequences of their actions. Needless to say, we definitely believe that our legal system is perfect and fair.

10. What are your views on the Mong Kok Incident in 2016?
With regards to the Mong Kok unrest, many media sources have reported about the involvement of many illegal parties, and even that of gangs or triads. So, are the demonstrators in the Mong Kok unrest really with pure intentions to speak up, for the sake of expressing themselves as Hong Kong citizens?

11. Do you agree with the government’s decision to charge participants (of the Mong Kok Incident in 2016) with the offence of rioting?
With regards to the arrest of those participants, we hope that the Hong Kong government has had solid evidence to support (their arrest), and that the trial process has been fair. I hope they receive a fair trial.
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二零一九年度香港大學學生會周年大選其他候選人包括候選常務秘書麥嘉晉、校園電視候選內閣、學苑候選編輯委員會及候選普選評議員。

2019年度周年大選中央諮詢大會將於一月二十一日至一月二十五日在中山廣場舉行，時間為下午十二時半至二時半。

Other candidates for the Annual Election 2019 include the Proposed General Secretary Mak Ka Chun Eugene, the Proposed Cabinet of Campus TV, the Proposed Editorial Board of Undergrad, and the Proposed Popularly Elected Union Councillor.

The Central Campaign for Annual Election 2019 will be held from the 21st to 25th of January at the Sun Yat-sen Place, from 12:30 to 14:30.