關於 rhetoric question ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

［沒有誰比誰高貴］（六之五）

反修例運動此前多場審訊，不論是襲警、藏武器、暴動案，在法庭裡的檢視方法，採取視覺較微觀。示威者在這條街被捕，隔一條街發生的事，不會視為相關。時間上檢視也收得狹窄，例如7.21元朗襲擊，或831太子站事件，示威者受事件影響之後上街，法庭不會視為有參考價值（relevant）.

然而國安法第一審，唐英傑開電單車涉衝向警察防線，車上插了「光復香港。時代革命」旗幟，案件搬到法庭，被提升到「恐怖活動」「煽動他人分裂國家」層次。

法庭對刑事案件審訊，多檢視可觸摸之物，如翻看閉路電視、檢視直播片段、化驗被告背包或手袋的物件。

但驗視一句話的意義，用甚麼方法，拉闊到歷史何年何月，翻查幾多本字典，還是要揭開人腦看看人的思想？

早幾天，辯方專家證人，港大學者李詠怡當被控方逼問舉殖民旗的人心裡想甚麼，梁天琦設計口號的心底意思。Eliza一度在庭上表示：「我沒法子有讀心術　（I am not a mindreader）.」

如何去讀一場社會運動的集體心理？社會學家，明顯和法律專家有不同看法。

這天，彭寶琴法官問及Francis，他如何理解「反修例運動的時間線(timeline)」。作為專研社運的學者，Francis認為運動由2019年6月9日開始，延續至大約2020年中，但難說某一日正式結束。彭官反問：「逃犯條例不是撤回了嗎？在2019年9月條例撤回後，李教授你仍然覺得運動繼續下去？」Francis說是。

彭官亦問Francis，「你在問卷中問示威者，那一個口號有代表性，但每一個集會不是有主辦單位嗎？大會不是有他們的主題？」（亦即民間所謂的大台）

Francis回應道，每次遊行雖有個別主題，但整場大型反修例運動不只是個別遊行。「例如人們最初對『齊上齊落』口號感到有共鳴，因為此口號表達了整場運動裡，示威者感到的團結精神和聯繫感(togetherness)。很多時候，口號不是直接與政策訴求有關，而是表達示威者的情感和感受。」

這天，辯方專家證人，中大新傳學院教授李立峯Francis進入第二天作供。高個子的他，頭髮長及頸，穿了淺灰色西裝外套，外套布料質地有反光效果，西裝上的縐紋特別顯眼。他出現在證人枱時，拿着橙色的布袋，把厚厚的文件塞在布袋內，擱在證人枱。

Francis喜歡把手踭擱在枱上，竪起前臂，長長的手指揮舞着，談起他熱愛的社科方法論，語速越說越快，微微地左右搖動帶輪辦公室椅子。法官不只一次請他說慢一點。

有些時候，三位法官們發問的問題，比雙方大狀們更多。

Francis說，曾向全香港市民抽樣撥打電話作民意調查。為了要有隨機性，撥打住戶家居電話時，會向聽電話的人問，若家居住戶多於一人，那一位同住者的生日日期較接近，則邀請該人來回答民調。

唯一的男法官陳嘉信，手指之間常夾着筆，雙眉上下舞動，立即發問：「為何打電話去家居要這樣問，而手機則不用問？」

Francis解答道：「在外國，曾有研究發現，在家庭中負責接電話的人，永遠都是家庭主婦。」法官杜麗冰聽到後，臉上綻放出會心微笑，更向陳官互相交換笑容。Francis續說：「又或者是年輕人搶着電話聽，這樣，民調做出來就會有偏差。」

另一個社會學方法論的提問，也是由陳嘉信法官追問出來的。Francis團隊亦曾於廿多場遊行或集會活動中做現場調查。調查員會被分派在集會或遊行現場，邀請參加者填問卷。

但隨着運動變得更流水式，出現更多變數，甚至出現衝突。為了保護調查員安全，例如7.27元朗遊行，他們會派出少量資深調查員到現場，派發含有QR Code的單張，示威者可以事後上網填寫。

無論是代表控方的周天行檢控專員，抑或法官都問Francis，讓人拿單張回去跟QR Code填問卷，怎樣肯定填的人真是去過現場？

陳嘉信法官問：「你說，填問卷的人很熱心，你怎知他們會不會『熱心』過頭，上網虛構答案？」他雙手在空中比劃着括號，把「熱心」二字強調。

Francis說，他們巧妙地在網上問卷中加入了一條題目：「這天在那一個示威地點加入隊伍」，亦有一個選項是：「我今天沒有參加遊行」。填表者並不知道，研究員會剔走沒參加遊行的人的意見。

「他們填的時候，不知道這條題目若答了，其實篩走了自己，最終我們便可以只分析參加過示威的人的數據。」三法官聽罷，明白學者一早想到這些漏洞，點頭表示明白。

法庭裡，尋找「光時」意義之旅，控辯雙方均花心力指斥對方研究方法有漏洞。

代表律政司的署理刑事檢控專員周天行，嘗試從Francis的研究裡，找尋不足之處。Francis和團隊以5種研究方法：全港性電話民意調查、示威現場問卷調查、焦點小組、連登討論區大數據分析、公共討論分析（時評人在傳媒的言論），多管齊下來理解社會運動中口號的意義。

周專員指，調查大部分於2020年初之前進行，而本案發生的日子（2020年7月1日）之前一段時間，即2020年2月至7月，Francis沒有相關研究。周專員問：「沒有任何事阻止你進行更多研究吧。」

Francis指，當他自己知道要做專家證人時，已是2021年4月底，時光追不回了。「我不能坐時光機回到過去(I cannot travel back in time to do it.) 周專員堅持追問，可以做電話民調呀。此時陳嘉信法官插嘴表達其看法：「即係你叫李教授在2021年問番啲人9個月前在想甚麼?」

Francis望着陳官說：「你說的我認同，即使可以問，搜集回來的數據也不會可信。問人今日在想甚麼會較可信，你問人一年前想甚麼，可信性甚低。」

周專員轉以「以子之矛」嘗試再去進攻。「你曾說過口號的意義會隨時間改變，你在案發前一段相關時間，無研究喎。」Francis再解釋，除非遇到重大事件，口號的意思隨時間改變，基本上是以年計，或以十年計，「口號意義改變，並非分分秒秒在變動」。

Francis在庭上首次披露，他團隊進行的「連登討論區」大數據研究，份量之浩瀚，他和團隊從連登「時事台」從2019年6月到8月21日的討論帖子及回應留言，涉及2千5百萬個，電腦檔案足有38GB。

周專員從枱底拿出幾疊白紙，原來他的團隊從連登討論區，人手萃取了一些帖文，叫Francis即場示範如何做Coding (編碼)工作。

西裝骨骨的Francis翻閱着文件，開始說：「呢位網民【四葉妹妹】有提及過「光復香港。時代革命」沒提及「港獨」及「五大訴求」，可算為「1, 1, 0, 0」; 網民【英國男孩】完全沒提，電腦會記為「0, 0, 0, 0」；這位【草尼馬仔】貼了光時旗的照片，不含文字留言，我們技術上沒法認出。但不改變們這個整個研究方法的合理性」。在嚴肅法庭，聽到鬼馬的網名，旁聽者都忍不住笑了出來。

控辯雙方過招，誰的「方法和總結」算是合理，光時究竟意義何在，是否違犯國案法？

Francis今天較完整披露他的看法。他認為，控方專家劉智鵬教授，以歷史及語言學角度去看「光時」這口號的意思，作出一個聲稱，就是「『光復香港。時代革命』這口號，只有唯一一個解讀，並為所有人共知」，「但我認為劉教授沒有提供充足證據去證明這個聲稱」。

Francis解釋，劉教授報告中用了「necessarily」一字，即口號詮釋的唯一可能「必然」是這樣，這是Francis自己認為需要用多種社科方法驗證的假設。

口號究竟是由喊的人那端衍生意思，還是從接收者那邊決定意思？

陳法官指，他理解控方劉專家報告中指的是，「喊口號的人懷有分裂國家意圖和目的」。但Francis卻說，喊口號基本上是一個「傳播行為」，不只是一個人單方面「個人表達」那麼簡單。

一個口號喊出來，是由嗌的人承擔意義發送者責任，還是接收的人也有份貢獻意義？如此哲學性問題，在法庭的空氣裡交鋒。

Francis又像在講課一樣，「作為傳播學者，我認為，喊口號是一個溝通行為，不只是一種自我表達。我嗌一個口號，會考慮接收者如何理解。」

小個子的法官杜麗冰，左手手指戴了綠寶石戒指，她一邊說話一邊以手部語言輔助她的比喻：「好像我跟一百個人說，我喜歡西瓜，有人會覺得我愛吃紅色的生果，另一個人覺得我愛吃綠色皮的水果。我發送一個訊息，但別人接收不同。」

Francis補充：「不止這樣，說話的人會小心用字。例如有一句句子意義明確，另一句句子的意義含糊，如果我要表達自己，減少誤會，我會選較明確的那句。」陳官提出，智力不同的人也會用字不同。

Francis反駁：「不只，也看大家出身甚麼背景，像你們法庭背景的人理解『引導性問題』(leading question)和我們社科人便不同，不只是智力差異的問題。」聽到這句話，杜官和陳官都作深思狀。

控方曾挑戰，指若文字意義多樣，人們便沒辦法溝通。Francis在此反駁：「劉教授說，人們會跟社會慣例(convention)去用字，但問題是，社會有很多慣例。文字使用很複雜，也有修辭學(rhetoric)作為一種慣例。劉教授把語言意義解得太過死板（too rigid），語言意義多樣，修辭令人們變通調適，否則世界便沒有創意寫作了（creative writing）。」

控方周專員指出，劉教授也有其「證據」，就是警方跟據示威錄影片段，數算有多少次出現「光時口號」，而這口號與「顛覆元素」如港獨訴求、暴力行為同時出現。Francis反駁，這數據只在「點算上」可靠，但兩件事同時出現(co-appearance)，並不等於有關。

Francis用一個生活化的例子，說明兩種同時出現的東西，無必然關係。「在大學，學生在班房可以自由入座，兩個大學生每次課堂都一起坐，可以解讀為他們是朋友；但在中學，課室座位是被編排的，兩個中學生常並排而坐，只能說他們是一起坐。」

然後，Francis就望着控辯雙方大狀的方向：「就像在這個法庭，李先生和周先生也一起坐，要考慮這是個法庭場景。」眾笑。

至於示威場景，有其特性，Francis解釋：「好像每年香港七一遊行，於同一個示威裡出現的團體，訴求可以不共容。如性小眾、勞工及外傭團體也會各自有訴求。」

即使大型示威有一些共同訴求，各人理解也有差異。Francis指，他有研究2014雨傘運動，其口號為「我要真普選」，「但落實到具體解釋，甚麼是『真』的普選？『真』字既開放又抽象，讓人各自己想象。」

文字容易於不同場景被誤解，Francis特別澄清了一個可能的誤會。焦點小組討論的指引中，研究員需要留意討論覆蓋不同範疇。其中一個範圍呈在法庭文件中，寫道：「社會運動意識形態和激進化(social movement ideology and movement radicalization」。

Francis特別澄清「激進」二字的在的學術意思：「激進化，在研究社運學術世界裡，意思是與社會常態的距離（deviation from social norm ），涉及更重大改變的意思，並沒有『好與壞』的評價。」

「好像反修例運動最初，有人要求『成立獨立調查委員會』，這訴求較溫和，因為過去香港也曾成立過，相比起來，『解散警隊』這口號則較激進」。陳官補充：「即是要求更徹底的社會改變。」

陳官亦引述文件中的資料，好奇地向Francis查問：「為何你認為『光復香港。時代革命』比『五大訴求』更激進呢？」Francis解釋：「修辭學上，『革命』比『訴求』所涉及的改變，幅度更大，這是明顯的。」

在香港的刑事審訊上，「不爭辯事實、客觀存在」是常用術語，去指控一個人做了一件事，作為刑事案的入罪條件。然而一支旗，一句口號，如何建基於事實，使用這種法律語言，又出現了奇特的交雜和火花：

周專員指出，警察報告中點算示威口號出現次數是「客觀、不爭辯的事實」。

Francis反駁道：「你們只是提供了口號在示威現場，曾出現過的這個事實。」

周進逼：「你們只是倚賴別人的意見。」

Francis：「我們紀錄了人們表達意見的這個事實。我們分析的文章、人們論述過這些意見，都是一種『社會現實』（social facts）」

周再問：「你是否同意，劉智鵬教授報告裡，他對光時口號的解釋，是對的(correct)？」

詮譯變成了對和錯，二元對立，二選一，社科學者抗議了。

Francis：「我們的總結是，口號是開放的，抽象的，不只一個解釋，每人有每人的論述。我不會評價一個時評家對口號的解釋，正如我不會評價焦點小組裡一個平凡人的解讀。(I wouldn’t judge)我不會說，這個人的解讀是正確，這只是他自己的說話　(I wouldn’t say if this guy is correct, it is his own articulation)。」

周不放棄：「你不會異議，若我說劉智鵬教授的解讀是對的。」

Francis斬釘截鐵回應：「我會異議，問題並不在對與錯」。

杜麗冰法官嘗試插話，問Francis：「你會否覺得劉教授可以作這樣的解釋，即使你不贊同其解讀？」

Francis說：「我個人不會對口號作這樣的詮釋。劉智鵬教授的詮譯，只是『其中一個詮釋』。其解讀的地位沒有特別高，也沒有特別低。相比起某一個時事評論員，或者我們焦點小組的某一個參與者。」

周天行在盤問到最後，拋出了這個問題：「我說，我方對口號的理解方法(approach)更可靠。」

Francis噗哧笑了，全場亦爆出陣陣笑聲：「哈哈，肯定不是。警察在『點算口號』上或許是可靠，但我挑戰警察報告中『對數據的理解』，當口號與顛覆元素共同於示威場合出現，根本不是支持口號有顛覆意義的證據。我對警察報告是完全不贊同。」

此時，周天行專員彎腰，跟坐在他旁的同事耳語了逾三十秒。

周專員回過頭，橫空拋出這句話：「我向你指出，你的報告不可靠，不相關。」

Francis咬字清晰，語氣肯定回應：「我的報告，既可靠，合乎標準，亦相關。」

誰的解讀更有權威？控方專家認為喊口號的人必然意圖顛覆；辯方則指出，口號是開放和曖昩的，任何人的解讀，都沒有比另一個人的解讀更有權威。

一支旗，八個字，意義之爭，連繫着多位國安法被告的命運。

國安第一被告唐英傑，身型壯碩，年輕的他坐在犯人欄，由幾個懲教署職員押送。

唐的學歷不算高，是一位日本餐廳的厨師，然而穿着深色西服的他，還押了一年後，出席他自己的審訊，連日聽學者解讀他舉過的一支旗，都堅持翻閱着厚厚的法律文件，專心地聽着耳機，坐在他旁邊隔了犯人欄的翻譯先生，即時以廣東話傳譯。

「Rhetoric….修辭學」英語對話，小聲的廣東話，在法庭後方響起了，兩條聲道有些重疊。

幾名穿墨綠色制服的懲教署職員， 和唐一起坐在寬闊的犯人欄內。懲教職員的身體，慢慢挪移越近唐的方向，他們偶爾也竪起耳朵，跟進學者們的辯論進程。連穿着保安制服的叔叔，都聽得懂英語，都留意到辯論擦出火花，露出驚訝的表情。

八個字，有罪還是無罪，全城關注。誰的解讀更高貴？

時鐘已到下午四時半，明天Francis繼續作供。

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https://www.facebook.com/wwviviantam/photos/a.1435553239866430/4237523026336090/

國安法首審專家證人系列（六之四）：［知行合一］
7月13日辯方專家李詠怡及李立峯作供
https://www.facebook.com/wwviviantam/photos/a.1435553239866430/4240215429400183/

國安法首審專家證人系列（六之五）：［沒有誰比誰高貴］
7月14日辯方專家李立峯作供
https://www.facebook.com/wwviviantam/photos/a.1435553239866430/4243328702422189/

國安法首審專家證人系列（六之六）：［選櫻桃的人］
7月15日辯方專家李立峯作供
https://www.facebook.com/wwviviantam/photos/a.1435553239866430/4245860505502342/

（圖為辯方專家證人中大新傳學院教授李立峯離開高等法院）

新刊出版 New issue out now!🤘🔥🔥🔥

Voices of Photography 攝影之聲
Issue 28 : #沖繩專題
The #Okinawa Issue　
　
「亞洲當代攝影文化現場系列」是我們聚焦亞洲各地影像文化與創作實踐的系列計畫，嘗試透過亞際跨域連結與在地論述視野，拓展我們對於攝影在亞洲的實踐歷程、視覺經驗、文化及其論域的認識座標，並藉此作為影像歷史與認識論的持續省思。
　
「沖繩專題」是此系列的第二輯，特別邀請影像研究者暨策展人町田惠美與許芳慈共同擔任客座主編。本期採雙向閱讀編輯，集結文論與訪談，穿越沖繩糾結的被殖民史與帝國陰霾，在霸權的支配和抵抗的鬥爭之間，批判地觀看沖繩的影像，以及作為影像的沖繩。
　
幾世紀前，位於太平洋上的琉球列島尚未成為「沖繩」，而是存在著一個封建君主制的國度——琉球王國，後經日本薩摩藩的島津氏入侵與大日本帝國擴張，廢琉設藩遭到併吞殖民，於1879年以「沖繩縣」編入日本國家體系之內。在二戰的尾聲、1945年激烈的沖繩島戰役後，美國的佔領統治期長達二十七年，沖繩從此劃進冷戰年代的軍事戰略島鏈。即使至1972年美國將沖繩「返還」日本，在「日美同盟」的交換條件下，僅為日本本土面積千分之六的沖繩，卻佈建了整體駐日美軍逾七成的軍事設施與基地。對某部分的沖繩來說，「戰後」彷彿被無限延長，使這個亞熱帶之島，彌漫著由地緣政治與新帝國主義擊燃而仍未散去的煙硝。
　
本專題介紹國吉和夫、石川真生、比嘉豐光與石川龍一等沖繩的影像實踐者，追索他們的生命經驗與攝影的多重構成，以及其間複雜的政治性問題意識；同時透過評論者仲里效、岡本由希子、仲宗根香織與井上間從文的專文，將影像之於沖繩、之於歷史，由慣常對於「如何再現」的注意力，置放於「如何建構」的維度。從而提示了影像不僅僅是從殖民的情境中派生，同時也反饋到殖民的情境裡，需要加以細緻地解析。
　
在專題的製作期間，由全球疫情激化的國際角力波濤洶湧。與沖繩同列第一島鏈的台灣等地讀者，閱讀本專題，或許會因類似的歷史背景與政治局勢處境而更能與沖繩共感。而在沖繩所帶來的種種啟示中，我們也將意識到對於當下的世界正在發生的反抗——無論是以國家主義修辭掩飾的極權主義和種族主義，或是以經濟復甦為號召的資本主義巨靈回魂，除非我們投入更多行動與關注，否則任何國家的「強國夢」，都會是人類史上的惡夢一場。
　
▍關於本期 About | https://bit.ly/vop-28
　　
The “A Study of Contemporary Photography in Asia” series is a serial project that focuses on imagery culture and creative practice in various regions of Asia. Through this connection and a view that pans across Asia, we are trying to expand our understanding of the process of practice, visual experience, culture and the identifying coordinates of photography in Asia, and using such knowledge as a continuous reflection of imagery history and epistemology.

Second in the series is the Okinawa issue that features Machida Megumi and Hsu Fang-Tze, both imagery researchers and curators, as our guest editors. This issue adopts a dual reading and editing process; a combination of essays and interviews brings readers through the complicated colonial history and the burden of empiricism on the island, taking a critical view of Okinawa’s imagery, and Okinawa as an imagined object while it struggled against hegemony.
　
Several centuries ago, there existed no “Okinawa”, but the Ryukyu Kingdom, a feudal kingdom in the Ryukyu Islands in the Pacific Ocean. After the invasion by the forces of the feudal domain of Satsuma, and subsequently by the Empire of Japan, the Ryukyu Islands were annexed and colonized, and in 1879, established as the Okinawa Prefecture. At the end of the Second World War in 1945, the U.S. forces occupied and ruled Okinawa for 27 years, sealing its fate in the strategic chain of islands in the Cold War era. Even when the U.S. forces “returned” Okinawa to Japan in 1972, the island, which only constitutes 0.6% of Japan’s total land area, houses more than 70% of the U.S.'s military facilities and bases stationed in the whole country under the US-Japan Security Alliance. To some parts of Okinawa, it almost feels like that the “post-war” era never ended, surrounding this subtropical island with a plume of smoke that rose from the collision between geopolitics and new imperialism.
　
In this series, we take a look at the layered composition of the life experiences and photography by Okinawan imagery practitioners Kuniyoshi Kazuo, Ishikawa Mao, Higa Toyomitsu and Ishikawa Ryuichi, as well as the complicated political consciousness that is birthed from this interaction. We also move our focus from the question of “how to represent” to “how to construct” the background of Okinawa and its history through the essays by Nakazato Isao, Okamoto Yukiko, Nakasone Kaori and Inoue Mayumo. Through such a redirection of focus, we see the need for a careful analysis as it shows us that imagery is not only generated from colonization, but also feeds back into the issue.
　
While putting this issue together, the world is being ravaged by the COVID-19 pandemic, intensifying power rivalries. We imagine that our readers in Taiwan and other areas, which belong in the first island chain alongside Okinawa, would feel even more relevance to the island (Okinawa), given our similar histories and political situations. As we feel inspired by Okinawa in many ways, we also become aware of the struggles that are happening around the world, whether it is one against totalitarianism and racism under the mask of nationalistic rhetoric, or the return of capitalism in the name of economic recovery. Until we put into action our words and resist, any dream of a “nation of great power” is but a nightmare for the history of humankind.
　
＿＿＿

Voices of Photography 攝影之聲
www.vopmagazine.com

【#TheDiplomat: 沈旭暉隨緣家書英文版🇭🇰】很久沒有向國際關係評論網 The Diplomat 供稿，但國際線十分重要，不應放棄。這次他們希望分享23條、國安法、反恐法風雨欲來的「新香港」前瞻，願國際社會能多了解快將出現的危機：

While the world is preoccupied with a fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing has been tightening its political grip on all aspects of Hong Kong’s civil society. Rumor has it that Beijing will push through legislating national security laws under Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law by unconventional means, such as massively disqualifying pro-democratic legislators or even directly applying a national law, widely argued as a major step to destroy the rights and freedom of Hong Kongers, and bring Chinese authoritarianism to Hong Kong.

After the 2019 protests, the administration of Carrie Lam, who theoretically is still leading the special administrative region of China, has little political capital at stake, with its legitimacy reaching rock bottom. The pro-government camp has dwindling prospects for the city’s upcoming Legislative Council election. The government‘s ”nothing to lose“ mentality is apparent from its recent blatant reinterpretation of the Basic Law’s Article 22 (another article that limits the influence of China’s offices in Hong Kong’s internal affairs). The debate is nothing new, but the pressure this time is quite different.

This article highlights the different strategies Beijing could adopt to enact Article 23 insidiously or under disguise to avoid backlash from the international community, while continuing to reap benefits from the city’s globally recognized special status. This seems to be part of Beijing’s brinkmanship to bring Hong Kong protesters and their supporters to their knees and move the city closer to authoritarianism. To counter these moves, Hong Kongers must define the boundaries beyond which Hong Kong falls into authoritarian rule and make a case as to why the city’s downfall is detrimental to the international community‘s interest.

The Long-Term Controversy Over National Security Laws

Back in 2003, the implementation of Article 23 was thwarted by the moderate pro-establishment politician James Tien. In face of overwhelming public disapproval of the law, he withdrew support and votes from his Liberal Party. However, 17 years later, it is hard to imagine Beijing following the old legislative playbook: start with a public consultation, followed by public discourse and political debate, and end with the majority rule. This playbook only works in peaceful societies ruled by a trustworthy government with integrity.

The aftermath of 2003, as well as the 2019 protests, should have taught Beijing and the Hong Kong government a lesson: pushing through national security legislation in a flawed parliament controlled by the minority pro-government camp would inevitably set off another full city-scale protest — and undoubtedly more fierce and focused this time. Given the current government’s numerous displays of dishonesty, it is conceivable that they will embark on a less-traveled path to implement Article 23.

Strategy One: “Anti-Terrorism”

In principle, one possible strategy could be to directly enact Chinese national law across Hong Kong, which can be achieved by declaring a state of emergency in the city. However, this is risky business as it would tarnish the integrity of “one country two systems” and subsequently Hong Kong’s international standing. Beijing, a risk-averse regime, is also unwilling to see Hong Kong’s status as a middleman for laundering money disappear into thin air.

Instead, Beijing could be concocting a narrative that would see Chinese national law applied to Hong Kong while not damaging Hong Kong’s international standing and Beijing’s own interests. The key word in this script is “anti-terrorism.” As early as 2014, pro-Beijing scholars have been claiming the emergence of “local terrorist ideology” on Hong Kong soil. Since the anti-extradition bill protests last year, government rhetoric frequently described the protests, which caused no deaths at all in the entire year, with phrases like “inclination to terrorist ideology.” That was a signal to the world that Hong Kong’s internal conflicts had ballooned into a national security issue. This gives the government the legitimacy to justify the implementation of Chinese national laws across the highly autonomous region to counter terrorism. The Chinese government knows that if it can persuade the world that terrorism exists in Hong Kong, and that it is as severe as the terror threat facing many other nations today, the international community will be less critical of Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong. Enacting Chinese laws directly is a convenient path that will save Beijing from having to tackle Hong Kong’s internal conflicts, basically turning the Hong Kong issue into a nonissue.

Strategy Two: Stacking the Legislature by Disqualifying Candidates

An even bolder strategy was probably foretold by a recent incident where the Hong Kong government and Beijing’s agencies for Hong Kong affairs (HKMAO and the Liaison Office) jointly criticized lawmaker Dennis Kwok for filibustering, framing it as “misconduct in public office” and “violating his oath.” It is incomprehensible to claim that filibustering goes against a lawmaker’s main duty; rather, it is common understanding that legislative work includes debating the law and representing public opinion against unreasonable laws. In a parliament controlled by the minority, pro-democratic members representing the majority of Hong Kongers are forced to express their objections using means like filibustering. Wouldn’t a lack of different political opinions turn the legislative branch into a rubber-stamp institution?

The above allegation has set a dangerous precedent for twisting the logic behind a certain provision in the Basic Law to target opposing lawmakers. In other words, to fulfill Beijing’s interpretation of the principal requirement for holding public office in Hong Kong, one could be required to take a meticulously legalistic approach to uphold the Basic Law down to its every single wording. A public official, by this new definition, not only needs to support “one country, two systems” or object Hong Kong independence, but also must abide by every single provision in the Basic Law. Worst of all, based on the previous cases, whether an official’s words or actions oversteps a provision is up to Beijing’s interpretation of his/her “intent.”

If this approach is applied, in the next election, there might be additional official questions for screening candidates like the following: “The Basic Law states that the enactment of Article 23 is a constitutional duty. Failing to support Article 23 legislation violates the Basic Law. Do you support it?” This question would suffice to disqualify even moderate or even pro-establishment candidates like James Tien. Even if any pro-democratic candidates were elected, once Article 23 re-enters the legislative process, they could risk ouster by raising objections.

Despite the absurdity of this tactic, the Chinese regime may just be tempted enough if such a strategy could resolve two of China’s current nuisances — voices of dissent in the Legislative Council and the previous failure to implement Article 23.

Strategy Three: The “Boiling Frog Effect”

Article 23 is not yet implemented, but the dystopian world that the protesters pictured in 2003 is already becoming reality. Regular citizens have been persecuted for “sedition” for sharing their views on social media or participating in legal protests; workers face retaliation for taking part in strikes; corporations are pressured to publicly side with the government’s stance; employees who have the “wrong” political views are fired; schools have been closely monitored for teaching material; protest-supporting fundraisers were framed for money laundering; a retweet or like may lead to persecution, under a colonial-era law. Only now have Hong Kongers woken up to their new reality — although the Basic Law technically protects citizens’ rights to speak, rally, march, demonstrate, and go on strike, the government could enfeeble civil rights by bending antiquated laws and legal provisions. The frequent abuse of law enforcement power on a small scale, such as improper arrests and police violence, is desensitizing the public and the international community. In a few years, Hong Kong will become unrecognizable. This is indeed a clever play on Beijing’s part to slowly strip away Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom, without causing much international attention.

Counter-Strategies Against Beijing’s Brinkmanship

Beijing’s overarching goal is to hollow out Hong Kong but, at the same time, avoid major backlash from the international community, which could spell the end of the privileged global status of Hong Kong not granted to other Chinese cities. Beijing also aims at preventing single incidents that could cascade down into mass protests as seen in 2003, 2014, and 2019; and eliminating any resistance forces from within Hong Kong’s legislature. The tactics outlined above are typical in a game of brinkmanship.

In response, Hong Kongers in Hong Kong and on the so-called “international frontline” must know their strengths and bargaining chips on this negotiating table with Beijing.

Unlike Xinjiang and Tibet, Hong Kong is a city with transparency and free flow of information. Hong Kongers need to make a case to the world that the protests are not acts of terrorism. Some suggestions include comparing the Hong Kong protests to similar struggles in 20 or so other counties in the world at the present time, none of which were classified as terrorism; collecting a large amount of concrete evidence of the disproportionate use of force by the Hong Kong police; and showing how enacting Chinese national laws in Hong Kong will end the city’s autonomy and spell disaster for international community‘s interests.

The Legislative Council is the institution that can counteract Beijing’s “boiling frog” strategy and to keep Hong Kongers’ hope alive in the system. Those who plan to run for legislative office must be prepared to be disqualified from running. If only individuals are banned, there need to be alternative candidates as back-up plans. However, if and when the disqualification process is applied broadly to entire camps of candidates (for example, all who object to Article 23), the pro-democracy camp must make a strong case to the Hong Kong and global public that this is the endgame for Hong Kong democracy. Then the incumbent popularly elected legislators will hold the internationally recognized mandate from the public and serve as the last resistance.

These recommendations delineates how the slogan “if we burn, you burn with us,” often seen in the protests, may play out in the game of international relations. If the national security laws are “passed” by a legislature that is jury-rigged in this manner, or if related national laws are directly implemented in Hong Kong, Hong Kongers should signal clearly to the world that it goes way beyond the promised “one country, two systems.” Crossing this red line by Beijing should be seen by the world as a blunt violation of its promised autonomy to Hong Kongers. At that time, if the international community led by the United States and the United Kingdom decided to revoke the “non-sovereignty entity” status of Hong Kong and regard the SAR as an ordinary Chinese city, it shouldn’t come as a surprise.

Dr. Simon Shen is the Founding Chairman of GLOs (Glocal Learning Offices), an international relations start-up company. He also serves as an adjunct associate professor in the University of Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and associate director of the Master of Global Political Economy Programme of the CUHK. The author acknowledges Jean Lin, Coco Ho, Chris Wong, Michelle King, and Alex Yap for their assistance in this piece.

▶️ 高度自治 vs 全面管治
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwt8wZl8jHQ