[翻轉視界 6] Taiwan's Unsung Heroes: Chao Wen-chang
In times of chaos, change and uncertainty, unsung heroes work quietly to improve our society one step at a time.
1. in times of 在……的時候;在……期間
2. an unsung hero/heroine 無名英雄/女英雄
3. one step at a time 一步步,按部就班*
在這個充斥著混亂、改變與不明確的時期,無名英雄為一步步改善我們的社會而默默付出。
*one step at a time: https://bit.ly/2ZPzq3o
★★★★★★★★★★★
Chao Wen-chang wears a bamboo hat and stoops over to sweep metal scraps. He’s sweating, but continues working hard. Chao’s job is difficult and his earnings slim, but he’s committed to giving away most his salary.
4. stoop over 俯身,彎腰
5. metal scraps 鐵屑
6. Heroes of Philanthropy 行善英雄榜
7. slim 非常小的 (這裡指收入很少)
8. be committed to 致力於、投入(時間、金錢)
戴著斗笠低頭彎腰工作,儘管衣服已經溼透,但趙文正先生依舊埋頭掃鐵屑。他的工作辛苦收入又不多,不過趙文正堅持行善。
★★★★★★★★★★★★
Always being the last one to pay his tuition fees in his elementary school, Chao has devoted himself to helping children in need. In 1979 he submitted his first donation in the name of his father, Chao Shi-hsuan. He has continuously donated 75% of his income to charity for the past 30 years. What’s more commendable is his wife and children’s supporting attitude toward his donations. They have devoted themselves to public services, and they live a simple and humble lifestyle. Chao, the small and thin man with strong principles, instructs his family to donate nearly every bit of his income to the public. “I keep a fourth and donate three-fourths. In the 80’s when my children were small, I didn’t donate as much. Now I can donate more. My children have grown and earn their own money,” Chao said.
9. tuition fees 學費
10. in need (金錢或食物) 缺乏,短缺
11. in someone’ name 以…之名
12. the sum of sth 全部數額 (這裡指金額)
13. commendable 值得讚揚的;值得推崇的
14. devote oneself to 獻身於
15. public service 公共服務
16. lead a…lifestyle 過…的生活
17. instruct(尤指正式地)指示,命令,吩咐
趙文正國小時總是全班最後一個交學費,從此立下決心,要幫助弱勢的孩子。從1979年以父親趙世旋之名捐出第一筆捐款,他30多年來將自己所得的75%全捐給慈善機構。身材瘦小的趙文正秉持「最低的需要留給自己和妻子,其他全數捐出!」,難能可貴的是妻兒無怨無悔地與他一起過著勤儉生活,一同致力公益。「留1/4,3/4捐出去。民國70多年小孩還小,捐比較少。現在捐比較多,現在小孩都長大,自己會賺錢」。
★★★★★★★★★★★★
Small sums over the years have added up to major contributions. Over three decades Chao has donated NT$4 million to charity. Moved by Chao’s generosity, The mayor of Taichung sent a letter recommending him to Forbes. The U.S. magazine concurred, including Chao as one of the four Taiwanese it chose for its list of 48 Heroes of Philanthropy from the Asia and Australia region in 2012.
18. small sums 一點一滴
19. over the years 這些年來
20. add up to sth 總共是;合計為
21. generosity 慷慨,大方
22. be moved by 為..所打動
23. recommend to 推薦
24. concur (v.) 同意,贊成;意見一致
25. philanthropy 仁慈;慈善;慈善行為;慈善事業
就是這樣一點一滴,趙文正30年來累積超過400萬善款,感於他的慷慨,當時的台中市長親自幫他寫信推薦給富比士雜誌,在2012年他入圍了雜誌評選的亞洲行善英雄榜,48人當中的4位台灣人之一。
★★★★★★★★★★★★
Thank you, Mr. Chao Wen-chang! We salute you!
★★★★★★★★★★★★
資訊與照片出處:
https://bit.ly/2XJfTP5
https://bit.ly/3cfpsL9
https://bit.ly/2zKonh9
照片出處:
https://news.ebc.net.tw/news/story/107347
★★★★★★★★★★★★
如何增進同理心: https://bit.ly/34qSKnC
Humans of Taipei: https://bit.ly/2S2Avjz
New Humans of Australia: https://bit.ly/2zc1xPm
#ChangingPerspectives
#翻轉視界
同時也有10000部Youtube影片,追蹤數超過2,910的網紅コバにゃんチャンネル,也在其Youtube影片中提到,...
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【 黎安友專文 l 中國如何看待香港危機 】
美國哥倫比亞大學的資深中國通黎安友(Andrew Nathan)教授最近在《外交事務》(Foreign Affairs)雜誌的專文,值得一看。
黎安友是台灣許多中國研究學者的前輩級老師,小英總統去哥大演講時,正是他積極促成。小英在美國的僑宴,黎安友也是座上賓。
這篇文章的標題是:「中國如何看待香港危機:北京自我克制背後的真正原因」。
文章很長,而且用英文寫,需要花點時間閱讀。大家有空可以看看。
Andrew這篇文章的立論基礎,是來自北京核心圈的匿名說法。以他在學術界的地位,我相信他對消息來源已經做了足夠的事實查核或確認。
這篇文章,是在回答一個疑問:中共為何在香港事件如此自制?有人說是怕西方譴責,有人說是怕損害香港的金融地位。
都不是。這篇文章認為,上述兩者都不是中共的真實顧慮。
無論你多痛恨中共,你都必須真實面對你的敵人。
中共是搞經濟階級鬥爭起家的,當年用階級鬥爭打敗國民黨。而現在,中共正用這樣的思維處理香港議題。
文章有一句話:“China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence.” 這句話道盡階級鬥爭的精髓。
中共一點都不焦慮。相反地,中共很有自信,香港的菁英階級及既得利益的收編群體,到最後會支持中共。
這個分化的心理基礎,來自經濟上的利益。
文中還提到,鄧小平當年給香港五十年的一國兩制,就是為了「給香港足夠的時間適應中共的政治系統」。
1997年,香港的GDP佔中國的18%。2018年,這個比例降到2.8%。
今日的香港經濟,在中共的評估,是香港需要中國,而不是中國需要香港。
中共正在在意的,是香港的高房價問題。香港的房價,在過去十年內三倍翻漲。
文章是這樣描述:
“Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.”
無論你同不同意這些說法,都請你試圖客觀地看看這篇文章。
有趣的是,黎安友在文章中部分論點引述了他的消息來源(但他並沒有加上個人評論),部分是他自己的觀察。
#護台胖犬劉仕傑
Instagram: old_dog_chasing_ball
新書:《 我在外交部工作 》
**
黎安友原文:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-09-30/how-china-sees-hong-kong-crisis?fbclid=IwAR2PwHns5gWrw0fT0sa5LuO8zgv4PhLmkYfegtBgoOMCD3WJFI3w5NTe0S4
How China Sees the Hong Kong Crisis
The Real Reasons Behind Beijing’s Restraint
By Andrew J. Nathan September 30, 2019
Massive and sometimes violent protests have rocked Hong Kong for over 100 days. Demonstrators have put forward five demands, of which the most radical is a call for free, direct elections of Hong Kong’s chief executive and all members of the territory’s legislature: in other words, a fully democratic system of local rule, one not controlled by Beijing. As this brazen challenge to Chinese sovereignty has played out, Beijing has made a show of amassing paramilitary forces just across the border in Shenzhen. So far, however, China has not deployed force to quell the unrest and top Chinese leaders have refrained from making public threats to do so.
Western observers who remember the violent crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square 30 years ago have been puzzled by Beijing’s forbearance. Some have attributed Beijing’s restraint to a fear of Western condemnation if China uses force. Others have pointed to Beijing’s concern that a crackdown would damage Hong Kong’s role as a financial center for China.
But according to two Chinese scholars who have connections to regime insiders and who requested anonymity to discuss the thinking of policymakers in Beijing, China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence. Beijing is convinced that Hong Kong’s elites and a substantial part of the public do not support the demonstrators and that what truly ails the territory are economic problems rather than political ones—in particular, a combination of stagnant incomes and rising rents. Beijing also believes that, despite the appearance of disorder, its grip on Hong Kong society remains firm. The Chinese Communist Party has long cultivated the territory’s business elites (the so-called tycoons) by offering them favorable economic access to the mainland. The party also maintains a long-standing loyal cadre of underground members in the territory. And China has forged ties with the Hong Kong labor movement and some sections of its criminal underground. Finally, Beijing believes that many ordinary citizens are fearful of change and tired of the disruption caused by the demonstrations.
Beijing therefore thinks that its local allies will stand firm and that the demonstrations will gradually lose public support and eventually die out. As the demonstrations shrink, some frustrated activists will engage in further violence, and that in turn will accelerate the movement’s decline. Meanwhile, Beijing is turning its attention to economic development projects that it believes will address some of the underlying grievances that led many people to take to the streets in the first place.
This view of the situation is held by those at the very top of the regime in Beijing, as evidenced by recent remarks made by Chinese President Xi Jinping, some of which have not been previously reported. In a speech Xi delivered in early September to a new class of rising political stars at the Central Party School in Beijing, he rejected the suggestion of some officials that China should declare a state of emergency in Hong Kong and send in the People’s Liberation Army. “That would be going down a political road of no return,” Xi said. “The central government will exercise the most patience and restraint and allow the [regional government] and the local police force to resolve the crisis.” In separate remarks that Xi made around the same time, he spelled out what he sees as the proper way to proceed: “Economic development is the only golden key to resolving all sorts of problems facing Hong Kong today.”
ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, MANY QUESTIONS
Chinese decision-makers are hardly surprised that Hong Kong is chafing under their rule. Beijing believes it has treated Hong Kong with a light hand and has supported the territory’s economy in many ways, especially by granting it special access to the mainland’s stocks and currency markets, exempting it from the taxes and fees that other Chinese provinces and municipalities pay the central government, and guaranteeing a reliable supply of water, electricity, gas, and food. Even so, Beijing considers disaffection among Hong Kong’s residents a natural outgrowth of the territory’s colonial British past and also a result of the continuing influence of Western values. Indeed, during the 1984 negotiations between China and the United Kingdom over Hong Kong’s future, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping suggested following the approach of “one country, two systems” for 50 years precisely to give people in Hong Kong plenty of time to get used to the Chinese political system.
But “one country, two systems” was never intended to result in Hong Kong spinning out of China’s control. Under the Basic Law that China crafted as Hong Kong’s “mini-constitution,” Beijing retained the right to prevent any challenge to what it considered its core security interests. The law empowered Beijing to determine if and when Hong Kongers could directly elect the territory’s leadership, allowed Beijing to veto laws passed by the Hong Kong Legislative Council, and granted China the right to make final interpretations of the Basic Law. And there would be no question about who had a monopoly of force. During the negotiations with the United Kingdom, Deng publicly rebuked a top Chinese defense official—General Geng Biao, who at the time was a patron of a rising young official named Xi Jinping—for suggesting that there might not be any need to put troops in Hong Kong. Deng insisted that a Chinese garrison was necessary to symbolize Chinese sovereignty.
Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong.
At first, Hong Kongers seemed to accept their new role as citizens of a rising China. In 1997, in a tracking poll of Hong Kong residents regularly conducted by researchers at the University of Hong Kong, 47 percent of respondents identified themselves as “proud” citizens of China. But things went downhill from there. In 2012, the Hong Kong government tried to introduce “patriotic education” in elementary and middle schools, but the proposed curriculum ran into a storm of local opposition and had to be withdrawn. In 2014, the 79-day Umbrella Movement brought hundreds of thousands of citizens into the streets to protest Beijing’s refusal to allow direct elections for the chief executive. And as authoritarianism has intensified under Xi’s rule, events such as the 2015 kidnapping of five Hong Kong–based publishers to stand trial in the mainland further soured Hong Kong opinion. By this past June, only 27 percent of respondents to the tracking poll described themselves as “proud” to be citizens of China. This year’s demonstrations started as a protest against a proposed law that would have allowed Hong Kongers suspected of criminal wrongdoing to be extradited to the mainland but then developed into a broad-based expression of discontent over the lack of democratic accountability, police brutality, and, most fundamentally, what was perceived as a mainland assault on Hong Kong’s unique identity.
Still, Chinese leaders do not blame themselves for these shifts in public opinion. Rather, they believe that Western powers, especially the United States, have sought to drive a wedge between Hong Kong and the mainland. Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong. As Xi explained in his speech in September:
As extreme elements in Hong Kong turn more and more violent, Western forces, especially the United States, have been increasingly open in their involvement. Some extreme anti-China forces in the United States are trying to turn Hong Kong into the battleground for U.S.-Chinese rivalry…. They want to turn Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy into de facto independence, with the ultimate objective to contain China's rise and prevent the revival of the great Chinese nation.
Chinese leaders do not fear that a crackdown on Hong Kong would inspire Western antagonism. Rather, they take such antagonism as a preexisting reality—one that goes a long way toward explaining why the disorder in Hong Kong broke out in the first place. In Beijing’s eyes, Western hostility is rooted in the mere fact of China’s rise, and thus there is no use in tailoring China’s Hong Kong strategy to influence how Western powers would respond.
IT’S NOT ABOUT THE BENJAMINS
The view that Xi has not deployed troops because of Hong Kong’s economic importance to the mainland is also misguided, and relies on an outdated view of the balance of economic power. In 1997, Hong Kong’s GDP was equivalent to 18 percent of the mainland’s. Most of China’s foreign trade was conducted through Hong Kong, providing China with badly needed hard currencies. Chinese companies raised most of their capital on the Hong Kong stock exchange. Today, things are vastly different. In 2018, Hong Kong’s GDP was equal to only 2.7 percent of the mainland’s. Shenzhen alone has overtaken Hong Kong in terms of GDP. Less than 12 percent of China’s exports now flow through Hong Kong. The combined market value of China’s domestic stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen far surpasses that of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and Chinese companies can also list in Frankfurt, London, New York, and elsewhere.
Although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.
Investment flowing into and out of China still tends to pass through financial holding vehicles set up in Hong Kong, in order to benefit from the region’s legal protections. But China’s new foreign investment law (which will take effect on January 1, 2020) and other recent policy changes mean that such investment will soon be able to bypass Hong Kong. And although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.
Wrecking Hong Kong’s economy by using military force to impose emergency rule would not be a good thing for China. But the negative effect on the mainland’s prosperity would not be strong enough to prevent Beijing from doing whatever it believes is necessary to maintain control over the territory.
CAN’T BUY ME LOVE?
As it waits out the current crisis, Beijing has already started tackling the economic problems that it believes are the source of much of the anger among Hong Kongers. Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.
u.s. elementary school 在 美國在台協會 AIT Facebook 的最讚貼文
美國在台協會40周年,七月份一起來慶祝台美在「藝術、文化與體育」方面的攜手合作吧!剛結束 #台灣傅爾布萊特 英語協同教師計畫的Shane Fuentes就提供了很棒的例子。他在金門高中籃球隊當志工教練,繼三月一起帶隊參加高中籃球乙級聯賽北區複賽,夏初再帶球員去他任教的安瀾國小提供免費的周末英文籃球營。球員教基礎籃球又教英文(請看影片),最後孩子學會籃球,球員強化領導技巧,大家還練習了英文。三殺成功!(啊,用成棒球名詞金拍謝!不過你懂我們的意思對吧?)#AITat40 #AmericanEnglish #FulbrightTaiwan #ETA
During July, the AIT@40 “Arts, Culture and Sports” month, we’ll be celebrating U.S.-Taiwan cooperation in the arts, culture, and sports. For example, former #Fulbright Taiwan English Teaching Assistant (ETA) Shane Fuentes helped lead the basketball team at National Kinmen Senior High School to Taiwan’s National Championship Tournament this past March as a volunteer coach. Earlier this summer, his players led a free weekend English basketball camp for students at An Lan Elementary School where he taught. The players taught basketball fundamentals and English at the same time (check out the video). In the end, Shane’s students learned a thing or two about basketball, and his players learned a ton about leadership. And everyone practiced English. That’s a triple play! (Oh, sorry, wrong sport! But you know what we mean, right?)
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