關於 extent翻譯 ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

「利潤」究竟是什麼

這一講不是要講經商，我們小小地梳理一個大大的話題：從經濟學角度看，人生應該追求什麼。

簡單地說，最值得追求的東西是「利潤」。

我不信你會不想要利潤。利潤是收入減去成本剩下的那一部分，是收穫比付出多出來的部分。利潤是正的，說明你的一切努力都沒有白費，說明瞭社會對你的肯定。利潤要是負的，就說明你創造的價值配不上你的一番折騰。

但你要是細想，利潤是一個神秘的東西。

＊

你必須直接去市場上買賣點什麼東西才談得上利潤。上班拿固定工資是沒有利潤的。哪怕你工資再高，那也只是你的勞動所得，都是根據你這個水平，你應該得的，是市場認為正好等於你的付出的回報 —— 這表現在你要是不上班就沒有收入。

而利潤則是「不該得」的東西，可以說是躺著賺的錢。這個性質曾經使得有些思想家認為拿利潤是不道德的。

馬克思譴責利潤。你開個工廠，買了機器和廠房，雇了工人，進了一批原材料，工人生產出產品，你把產品賣掉。然後你一算賬，賣產品的收入減去工人工資、機器廠房和原材料的花費，還多出來了一筆錢，這就是利潤。你欣然把這筆錢放入自己口袋。馬克思說且慢！工人累死累活工作才拿那麼一點工資，你幹什麼了就拿這麼多錢，你那叫剩餘價值！你無償佔有了別人創造的價值。
你當然不服氣。你說不是啊，我管理工人，我組織生產，我聯繫了進貨和銷售，我安排廠裡的大事小情，這怎麼不是創造價值呢？

馬克思會告訴你，你做的這些事兒的確也是勞動，你可以拿一份高工資，但你的工資不會像利潤那麼高。你完全可以雇一個職業經理人替你管理工廠。你把職業經理人的工資發了，還會剩下一筆錢，這筆錢才是真正的利潤。

這個計算讓馬克思深感憤怒，產生了深遠的影響……咱們還是單說資本主義這邊對此是怎麼想的。崇尚市場的經濟學家也算了這個賬，但結果是利潤好像不應該存在。

我們假設老張開工廠賺了一萬塊錢的「淨」利潤。這個是把老張本人付出的管理勞動該拿的那部分報酬去掉之後剩下的錢，是老張「躺賺」的錢。那如果是這樣的話，市場上就應該出來一個老李：老李說既然是躺賺，我不用那麼高的利潤，我躺賺五千元就行，我願意把商品賣便宜點，給工人工資高點。那你說老張能幹過老李嗎？

你很容易想到老張繼續存在的理由。比如老張有資本而老李沒有。或者老張跟政府關係好，壟斷了這塊業務。或者老張掌握一個技術護城河，老李學不會。但是對經濟學家來說這些都不是本質問題：資本可以貸款，跟政府的關係可以用一個更好的條件重新談，技術可以請人研發。事實上，經濟學家的推理是，哪怕現在還沒有一個具體的老李，只要市場存在老李出現的可能性，老張就不敢壓榨太高的利潤，他必須用比較低的價格和比較高的工資預防老李的出現。
要這麼算的話，市場充分競爭的結果一定會把利潤變成 0。總會有一個老王出來，說我就當自己是個職業經理人跟大家交朋友算了，我拿個應得的工資就行，利潤我不要。

那真實世界里的利潤是從哪來的呢？當然市場不可能是充分競爭的，總會有些老張偶爾能享受到利潤……但市場力量應該讓利潤越來越薄才對。經濟學家必須找到一個產生利潤的過硬的機制，否則解釋不了為什麼總有人拿那麼高的利潤……甚至解釋不了為什麼有人願意開公司。

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利潤從哪裡來這個問題的解決，在經濟學史上是一個里程碑。1921年，美國經濟學家弗蘭克·奈特（Frank Knight, 1885-1972）出版了《風險、不確定性與利潤》（Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit）一書 [1]，提出了一個傳世的洞見：利潤來自不確定性。

組織生產、採購和營銷、日常的管理，企業中一切常規的操作都可以由拿固定工資的人做，只有一件事必須由企業家本人做，那就是風險決策。

比如說，為了在今年秋季上市一批新女裝，我們必須在夏天就定下來款式，備工備料，展開生產。可是秋天還沒到，現在誰也不知道到時候流行哪個款式，那我們生產什麼呢？這個決策，必須由企業家本人做出。為什麼？因為他是承擔決策風險的人。

如果你賭對了，秋季正好流行這款女裝，因為別的服裝廠沒生產只有你生產出來了，你就佔據了稀缺，你就可以要一個高價，利潤歸你。你要是賭錯了，到時候服裝賣不出去，工人和經理們還是會拿同樣的工資，損失也歸你。
生產、日常管理、冒險，是三種不同的能力。為什麼企業家要開公司？因為他敢冒險。為什麼工人和經理人選擇拿固定工資？因為他們不想冒險。

這個道理聽著挺簡單，但是其中有個大學問。奈特之前的經濟學家也想到了企業家承擔風險，但是他們沒搞清楚到底什麼是風險。

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如果女裝只有比如粉色和綠色兩個選擇，而且你明確知道它們流行的可能性都是 50% —— 那這個風險其實不用企業家承擔。因為你可以買保險！概率已知的風險都是可以管理的。銀行可以給生產兩款女裝的工廠都提供貸款，到時候肯定一個賠錢一個賺錢，只要利息和保險合適，銀行和企業雙贏。有這個保險機制在，大家誰都不用冒險，可以各自拿一份固定工資，根本不需要企業家。
奈特的真正貢獻在於，他把風險給分成了兩種。

第一種就叫「風險（risk）」，但是特指那些已知概率大小的風險。這種可以用保險解決，不需要企業家。

第二種叫「不確定性（uncertainty）」，是指那些無法評估概率大小，可能是從來沒出現過的新事物，甚至是現在人們根本無法想象的東西。這個不確定性，才是企業家存在的理由，才是利潤的來源。

現代經濟學家把這個不確定性特別稱為「奈特不確定性（Knightian uncertainty）」。我們專欄講過 [2]，統計學家有個更科學的說法。已知概率大小的，叫做「偶然不確定性（Aleatoric uncertainty）」， 也叫統計不確定性。不知道概率大小的，叫做「認知不確定性（Epistemic uncertainty）」，也叫系統不確定性。前者發生的事情都是你事先能想到的，後者則是你想不到的。比如「黑天鵝」事件，就是一種認知不確定性。

你開一個賭場。賭場每天都在跟賭徒們賭博，但是因為輸贏的概率是固定的而且有利於你，所以你的日常經營本身並不是冒險。真正的冒險是要不要開這個賭場：你能預測客流量足夠讓你收回投資嗎？你能擺平當地黑社會嗎？你能確保政府發展博彩業的政策不會變嗎？這些事兒沒法計算概率。

搞定這些不確定性，才是企業家該乾的事兒，也是企業家的回報所在。

流行趨勢通常不能用以往的經驗判斷。有個企業家認准了一個全新的款式，說我非得生產這個，銀行能給他擔保嗎？這個不確定性沒法系統化管理，他自己必須承擔 —— 這才是企業家存在的意義。你要是願意給這樣的項目投資、分擔不確定性 —— 而不是把錢交給銀行拿固定的利息 —— 你也是企業家。

要做服裝這一行的企業家，你肯定得對流行趨勢有個很好的感覺才行。不過企業家本人不一定非得特別懂女裝 —— 他完全可以請人來給他設計，只是設計師不承擔不確定性，人家拿固定的設計費，風險還是要由企業家承擔。

簡單說，企業家，是市場上的 player。他拒絕聽別人的安排，非得按照自己的想法決定做什麼，然後他安排別人也按照這個想法去做，最後他獨自承擔後果。

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奈特找到了公司存在的最根本理由。市場競爭再充分也不可能是絕對可預測的，未來總會有各種各樣的不確定性，需要企業家在各個方向上大膽探索。奈特後來成為經濟學的大宗師，他本人沒得過諾貝爾獎但是他有五個弟子得了諾貝爾經濟學獎，他是「芝加哥學派」的祖師爺。

奈特之後，別的經濟學家又找到了公司存在的其他理由。比如科斯說公司減少了交易成本能起到協調作用。張五常說公司提供了合約。還有人說公司解決了監督、提供了資源獨特性……等等等 [3]，但是奈特這個「不確定性」的說法，是最根本的。

如果從某一天開始，世界上再也沒有不確定性了，那麼市場的力量就會迅速把公司利潤變成 0：企業家就不需要存在，大家都應該拿固定工資。

其實現在企業家的日子也不好過。我們看街上那些餐館，開了關關了開，真正能長期賺錢的沒有幾家，可能大部分老闆都是賠錢。沒有稀缺是不可能賺到錢的，但是利潤只發生在你剛剛掌握某種稀缺、而別人還沒有跟上的那個時間段。別人跟上了，模仿了，你就必須再去尋找新的不確定性。

一切賺錢的生意都有不確定性。你把一大筆錢放銀行裡拿利息，那叫躺著花錢不叫躺著賺錢。哪怕是買幾套房子收租金，你都得面對房產市場的不確定性。
世界上沒有一勞永逸的利潤，也沒有真正躺著賺錢的企業家。

那你說平均而言，企業家的收益是正的還是負的呢？我到底該不該去做個企業家呢？沒有答案。有答案就不叫不確定性了。

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不確定性都是從哪來的呢？一個有意思的不確定性是中國經濟學家張維迎在 2008 年的一次演講中說的 [4]。他說中國改革開放這麼多年之中，商業活動最大的不確定性，是「體制的不確定性，政策的不確定性，政府行為的不確定性。」這體現在政府對資源的調配非常隨意。

張維迎當時說，正是這個不確定性加劇了中國的貧富差距。在中國市場化程度高，體制不確定性低的地區，比如浙江省，人們更富裕，收入差距反而更低：因為利潤分布更均勻。

這個規律是不確定性越大，利潤就越高 —— 企業家為利潤而奮鬥，但是市場看不見的手恰恰在降低總利潤。是那些看得見的手，提供了額外的不確定性，才給人帶來不合理的利潤。

那你說如果我們把體制給理順，讓競爭越來越公平，未來的不確定性會不會越來越少呢？不一定。

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奈特列舉了不確定性的好幾種來源，比如未來人口的變化、資源的供給等等。其中我們現代人最關注的肯定是創新。創新本質上是不可預測的，你不知道未來會有什麼新技術出來，你也不知道一個新技術出來會不會被市場接受。一切創新都有強烈的冒險成分，關於這一點已經有太多經濟學家討論了。

而奈特更厲害的一個洞見，則是「價值」的不確定性。說白了就是人的慾望的不確定性，你不知道未來的人喜歡什麼。奈特 1924 年發表了一篇文章叫《經濟學中科學方法的局限性》，說經濟學不僅僅是什麼資源的有效調配，把一個什麼價值函數最大化的問題，因為人的價值觀是會變的 ——
「人生在根本上是對價值的探索，是努力發現新價值，而不是照著現有的價值觀把生產和享受最大化。」[5]

一百多年前整天坐馬車的人沒有想要一輛汽車。2006 年以前的人並不期待智能手機。今天的多數人不能理解馬斯克為什麼非得讓人去火星。人生的終極任務不是滿足某種價值，而是發現和創造新價值。

因為這個見識，奈特後來被認為是個道德哲學家，而不僅僅是個經濟學家。
也因為這一點，你不需要非得是個企業家，也不一定非得拿金錢利潤。藝術家、教育家、每個工人和管理者、包括每個消費者，都可以是價值的發現者和不確定性的製造者。

只要把周圍的世界往你想的那個方向上推動一小步，就算是你的成功。

注釋
[1] 弗蘭克·奈特，《風險、不確定性和利潤》，中文有郭武軍、劉亮翻譯版，華夏出版社 2013。
[2] 精英日課第三季，哪種不確定性？什麼黑天鵝？
[3] 關於公司為什麼存在的理論發展總結，可參考向松祚，《新經濟學》第二卷，新經濟範式。
[4] 張維迎的這次演講首次發表於《經濟觀察報》2008年1月20日，修改後的文章曾收入作者主編的《中國改革30年：10位經濟學家的思考》。
[5] Frank Knight (1924), "The limitations of scientific method in economics」, 原文是「Now this, we shall contend, is not very far; the scientific view of life is a limited and partial view; life is at bottom an exploration in the field of values, an attempt to discover values, rather than on the basis of knowledge of them to produce and enjoy them to the greatest possible extent. We strive to "know ourselves," to find out our real wants, more than to get what we want. This fact sets a first and most sweeping limitation to the conception of economics as a science.」

這幾天在英國吵得沸沸揚揚的新聞

不是鳳梨、不是疫苗、更不是福原愛

而是哈利與沒根這對驚世夫妻檔的訪談

讓平時沒在關心英國皇室的大先生跟胎胎，以及好多住在英國的人都炸鍋

先不說他們要這、要那、要頭銜又不要盡責任義務、沒根說不知哈利是王子、種族歧視...等等令人翻白眼的言論

白金漢宮在訪談後的隔天立即代表地表上最強的阿嬤女王發表回應

短短的幾句回應，如果不熟知英國人話中有話的文化，我們大概就是會逐字去翻譯句子的意思

殊不知每一句話背後都有其另外的意涵

大先生以他身為一位英國人對英國人的瞭解，他看到的解讀如下：

以第1段來說，The whole family is saddened to learn the full extent of how challenging the last few years have been for Harry and Meghan.
逐字翻譯的意思是整個家族都非常的難過且了解過去幾年對哈利與沒根多麼地具有挑戰

👉這裡使用full extent 暗指雞毛蒜皮的家務事

第2段的第1句 The issues raised, particularly that of race, are concerning. 逐字翻譯是這幾個議題，尤其是種族的議題是我們關心的事

"are concerning " 翻成白話文就是妳們說的我都聽到了

第2句 While some recollections may vary 逐字翻譯指部份回憶可能有出入，白話文就是不要道聽塗說、斷章取義

第3句 they are taken very seriously and will be addressed by the family privately 逐字翻譯指以上的議題都會被家族嚴肅看待並私下處理

👉白話文就是妳不要再在電視上講些543的家務事

最後一句 Harry , Meghan and Archie will always be much loved family members
哈利、沒根與阿奇永遠都是我們最摯愛的家人

👉白話文就是不管妳們在外面如何瞎搞，阿嬤還是愛妳們的唷~ 😘😘

最後鏗鏘有力的大寫ENDS

👉雖然官方文件都是以這樣結尾，但是翻成白話就是以上林皺罵都知道了，可以閉嘴了 。

住在英國北部的胎胎，似乎彷彿都看到英國南部女王頭上冒的煙了呢~

英國人罵人不帶髒字的文化，沒根可能還滿臉問號呢~🚬🚬🚬

📢英國工商服務代購社團天天上新品
https://www.facebook.com/groups/Rachelscollection

♥ Instergram:
https://www.instagram.com/rachel.c.f/

【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】

***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated，將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像：以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文（https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/）翻譯成英文，鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演，在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***

中文精簡版本：https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/

Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.

In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.

The possibility of realizing legislative majority

Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.

The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?

Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.

Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.

Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority

To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.

While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.

Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.

Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.

Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP

What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.

Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.

The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.

Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution

Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.

Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.

The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.

All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.

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